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 The following thesis analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and whether or not codified guidance on executing 
COIN operations successfully translated to operational success on the battlefield.  The 
U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, authored by General 
Petraeus, underpins the assessment on how well the U.S. has wielded political, economic, 
and security power in these conflicts. Crowding the policy and national security arena is 
the debate over if the U.S. rightfully aligned its end, ways and means in support of 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. This 
thesis espouses a slightly different approach by examining whether or not U.S. COIN 
principles and practice are incongruent to ensure campaign success.    
The paper is divided into three chapters, each dedicated to answering a question 
on how well the U.S. operationalized its COIN doctrine across interagency domains. The 
first chapter analyzes whether or not COIN operations diminish U.S. military full-
spectrum readiness. The second chapter dissects whether the U.S. employed a 
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach with a balanced civilian-military fighting 
force. Lastly, the third chapter ascertains whether or not unmanned aerial vehicles are a 
more viable kinetic option in COIN warfare than U.S. ground forces.  The three chapters 
contain individual case studies, coupled with a hybrid of primary and secondary research 
approaches, to test the hypotheses presented. Yet all of them contain the overarching 
backdrop of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since it is these wars that inspired 
the publication of the Field Manual.  
 iii 
 I conclude that the U.S. has not properly coupled its doctrine to its employment 
paradigm in its decade-long COIN campaigns. The U.S. has levied onerous requirements 
on its ground forces while not adequately leveraging its political and economic power to 
apply a multi-faceted response, consequently oversoftening the Department of Defense 
and underhardening civilian institutions. Lastly, unmanned aerial vehicles should more 
aggressively augment U.S. ground troops in killing the insurgents, allowing our foot 
soldiers to focus on other COIN activities among the populace. The U.S. has not 
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The U.S. has been embroiled in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in the Middle 
East for over a decade and it has consumed the focus of its military’s readiness paradigm. 
The American way of conducting COIN operations, as codified within U.S. Army/Marine 
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, authored by General Petraeus, is unambiguously 
comprehensive, and the U.S. has worked tirelessly to achieve strategic success by 
translating the policy prescriptions into operational success in Iraq and Afghanistan.    
Indeed, COIN theory has dominated political and academic arenas as much as COIN 
campaigns have dominated the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the heart of the 
debate is whether or not the U.S. rightfully aligned its end, ways and means in support of 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Yet I 
approach the debate through a slightly different lens by examining whether or not U.S. 
COIN principles and practice are incongruent. The author concludes that the U.S. has not 
properly coupled its doctrine with its employment paradigm in its COIN campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The answers to the three questions that the author asks all share a 
pessimistic undertone: the U.S. has not effectively wielded political, economic, and 
security power in these conflicts.  
 COIN warfare is not new for the U.S.  The U.S. conducted COIN operations in 
the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, and more infamously known in Vietnam in 
the 1960s and 1970s. While the U.S. military is arguably the most effective COIN force 
today, history tells us that a robust toolkit involving economic, security, and political 
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power is required to contain or eradicate insurgents and their motivations. Thus, our 
COIN doctrine stipulates a whole-of-government, holistic and decentralized operational 
platform to effectively conduct COIN operations. However, this has yielded a prominent 
assumption within the policy and national security realm that COIN warfare is uniquely 
un-kinetic and more humanized than other types of warfare, such as combined armed live 
fire and maneuver or air-to-air combat. It is sophomoric to surmise that COIN warfare is 
less violent, and the U.S. tactical response to the existing U.S. COIN doctrine 
marginalizes the importance of killing its enemy in COIN. U.S. political strategy is clear: 
it aims to deny terrorists the ability to establish safe havens to plan and conduct attacks 
against the U.S.; it has simply chosen to operationally achieve that strategic objective by 
employing COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 I ask three questions that seek to answer how effectively the U.S. has 
operationalized its COIN doctrine. The first chapter analyzes whether or not COIN 
operations diminishes U.S. military readiness and adversely impacts its ability to conduct 
its core, designed missions. The second chapter dissects if the U.S. employed a 
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach with a balanced civilian-military fighting 
force. Lastly, the third chapter ascertains whether or not unmanned aerial vehicles are a 
more viable kinetic option in COIN warfare than U.S. ground forces.  All chapters 
contain individual case studies, coupled with a hybrid of research approaches, to test the 
hypotheses presented. Yet all of them contain the overarching backdrop of COIN 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The first chapter explores whether the focus on COIN operations over the last 
twelve years that have largely dictated how the U.S. military produces warfighting 
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capabilities enhance or detract from United States military’s conventional readiness. The 
paper is split into three sections. The first section examines COIN theory and the critical 
ingredients for successfully executing COIN operations, and the difference between 
conventional and unconventional warfare. The second section assesses what types of 
investments the United States military have made during 21
st
 COIN campaigns and the 
futility of these augmented force structure changes and costs for high-end conventional 
kinetic warfare. Third, it addresses the military’s appetite to divest these capabilities and 
investments in support of regaining full-spectrum combat capabilities at the culmination 
of COIN operations.  
Given the robust and oftentimes contradictory nature of COIN warfare, I provide 
an upfront thorough background to COIN fundamentals. I leverage COIN theorists and 
assumptions that underline the American way of fighting unconventional wars, and 
provide a broad context in which COIN operations are conducted. To understand the 
effects of COIN warfare on United States’ conventional military readiness, I use 
Afghanistan (and Iraq where the data is not discernible from each other) as the prime case 
study for making my argument. Because overseas contingency operations costs in support 
of these wars have remained disentangled from the annual baseline defense budgets, the 
investments specifically made for 21
st
 century COIN operations are entirely 
distinguishable from “business as usual” investments. Specifically, I decompose COIN 
warfare investments in personnel, training and equipment arenas using Congressional 
budget documents, Department of Defense doctrine and policy guidance, and Service-
specific publications.  
 4 
Not only have the military Services grown their force in sheer numbers, but they 
had to alter the composition of those forces to generate niche skill sets required for COIN 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, as the U.S. withdraws from these conflicts, the 
Services’ plans to reduce end-strength largely resemble pre-9/11 force levels. Secondly, 
the Services revolutionized their collective training exercises to replicate the operational 
environment by injecting role players and scenarios in preparing for deployment. Recent 
promulgations that they are reverting back to training blueprints that focus on high-end 
combat capability reflects the need for the Services to divorce themselves from COIN 
preparedness to regain full-spectrum readiness.  
I conclude in my first chapter that the U.S. military has perceived 21st century 
COIN warfare as a protracted obligation rather than as an opportunity to refine its role in 
a highly complex and irregular world. As a result, military conventional readiness has 
suffered, and the military Service-augmented capabilities and corresponding investments 
are feckless in confronting similarly equipped adversaries. The theoretical underpinning 
of COIN requires a burdensome set of combat capabilities among its military personnel 
and a strategic shift away from kinetic supremacy. The Department’s regression from 
COIN operations indicates it has placed too high of an emphasis on nation building as a 
fighting tool rather than fighting itself. The Department’s current and planned 
investments gives fidelity to its perception that the core principle of fighting should be 
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The second chapter dissects whether or not the U.S. employed a comprehensive, 
whole-of-government approach with a balanced civilian-military fighting force. The 
literature review details the arguments made by COIN advocates that a more civilian-
oriented fighting force breeds economic and political success by uprooting the local 
populace’s disaffection with the host government, thus guaranteeing long-term stability 
and economic sustainment. Others, such as military hawks and neo-conservatives, 
maintain that the military should modulate as a kinetic political body in order to execute 
COIN campaigns on a global and perpetual basis, and argue that the likelihood of U.S. 
engagement in fragile or failed states is ever-increasing.  I reference a host of policy 
statements, news releases, Congressional reports, and U.S. government official reports to 
reinforce whether or not the U.S. needs to increase civilian involvement within its COIN 
campaigns.  
Specifically, the analysis unpacks the role of the Department of State and USAID 
in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, serving as my two case studies to ascertain the 
success and challenges in the two conflicts. I discuss the joint initiatives engendered 
within these agencies to further COIN operational objectives, and how capabilities 
required for fighting U.S. COIN operations inherently exist within soft power agencies 
more so than within the military. Notably, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce 
expanded U.S. civilian presence in support of building governance and security capacity 
in Afghanistan, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams were created to expedite national 
reconstruction and development projects. However, these two primary organizations 
germane to the Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction portfolio lack the 
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capacity, authorities and cost to rapidly deploy their organic capabilities in support of 
large-scale, protracted war efforts. 
I conclude within my second chapter that although the United States has 
attempted to employ a whole-of-government approach for counterinsurgency operations 
in Afghanistan, it has failed by placing too much emphasis on the military component 
and not enough on the civilian side. Of the roughly $1.2 trillion that has been 
appropriated for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has received about 94%.
2
 
The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have been allocated approximately $67 billion, comprising of about 5%.
3
 The 
U.S. needed to leverage a proportionately larger number of civilians. Having done so 
would have likely prolonged the political tolerance of the United States’ involvement in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Lastly, the third chapter examines whether or not unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV) are a more viable kinetic option in COIN warfare than U.S. ground forces. U.S. 
COIN paradigm requires a heavy emphasis on non-kinetic activities; that is, those 
addressing the political, economic, and social vulnerabilities of the host nation 
government that fuel the insurgency, but has it downplayed the significance of the kinetic 
requirements as a result?  The COIN operational trifecta stipulates that counterinsurgents 
must concurrently protect the population, build sound governance and kill insurgents. 
The last of the three is ostensibly the most combat-intensive, and I assess whether or not 
UAVs can effectively augment the hard power exercised in COIN operations as 
previously fulfilled by U.S. foot soldiers.  
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UAV operations in Pakistan and Yemen serve my primary case studies and as the 
bedrock of my analysis.  I leverage a variety of data sources, to include strategic defense 
documents, open source CIA and DIA documents, congressional reports, think-tank 
reviews, surveys from civilians in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. I chose 
counterterrorism (CT) campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen to illuminate the contrast in the 
U.S. operational approach to COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, I 
argue why the transferability of U.S. COIN campaigns within the last decade in Pakistan 
and Yemen are futile given their tenuous political, economic and social conditions. U.S. 
ground troops interwoven into the indigenous population to embolden their fight against 
insurgents would foment additional discontent again the host government, and would 
further the insurgents’ momentum. Surgical means to combat the insurgents in Pakistan 
and Yemen, coupled with top-down political advisory and economic development teams, 
yields the best chance to continue containing and killing key insurgents aiming to attack 
the U.S. as well as begin to address endogenous political and economic challenges facing 
Pakistan and Yemen.  
Much like the first and second chapters, my conclusion within the last chapter is 
cynical; the U.S. has not fully employed UAVs to offset the soft power required in U.S. 
COIN campaigns. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that the expectation 
for ground troops to both show restraint of force among the civilian population and then 
quickly use it against insurgents is overambitious. UAVs, the premier weapon within 
U.S. CT operations, should also be the pre-eminent kinetic method within U.S. COIN 
operations. The U.S. has been reticent to interlace CT and COIN tactics, and it has 
necessitated that ground troops employ hard and soft tactics simultaneously.  
 8 
Unfortunately, victory in the COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan appears all 
but elusive, and my conclusions contribute to the understanding of why.  The U.S. has 
over-encumbered the Department of Defense to orchestrate and execute COIN campaigns 
that require military personnel to concurrently fight insurgents and foster sound and 
legitimate governance in the eyes of the local populace.  Not only has this proven 
untenable for political survival, but also it has diluted U.S. military readiness for 
conventional combat missions. Moreover, it did not sufficiently balance political and 
economic power across U.S. bureaucratic institutions to apply the economic and political 
tools needed to align U.S. COIN theory and practice. While programs and initiatives 
created by U.S. State Department and USAID are laudable, they were hindered by cost, 
authorities, and capacity constraints. Lastly, the CT element of COIN has been silenced 
within the U.S. strategy to deny terrorists the safe havens to plan and execute attacks on 
the U.S., and UAVs should be the weapon of choice to achieve American strategic 
objectives going forward.  
The promulgation of a new defense strategy in January 2012, titled Sustaining 
U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, in addition to the refined 
counterterrorism strategy heralded by President Obama in May 2013, represent political 
platforms articulating a conspicuous shift away from U.S. COIN operations and more a 
parochial focus on executing high-end combat operations and defeating terrorism 
globally. U.S. COIN theory will remain for now, but we should acknowledge our 
operational malpractice, and focus on retooling our warfighting profile to conduct more 




21st Century Counterinsurgency within the United States Military: A Misguided 
Guidebook for Strengthening Conventional Warfare Capabilities? 
 
Introduction 
The hyper-focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations over the last twelve 
years has largely dictated the way the United States military produces warfighting 
capabilities and how it trains for operational success. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have required a metamorphosis of how the Services generate ready forces in order to 
effectively employ the unconventional tactics required by COIN. Department of Defense 
guidance asserts that COIN requires joint forces to both fight and build nations 
sequentially or simultaneously.
4
 As opposed to conventional warfare, the success of 
COIN is predicated upon the counterinsurgents’ ability to influence and control the 
population instead of enemy forces. Thus, the counterinsurgents necessitate a different 
mix of capabilities.  
With the need for the United States military to modulate its force structure in 
support of 21
st
 COIN campaigns, does a concentration on preparedness for COIN 
enhance or detract from United States military’s conventional readiness? COIN warfare 
has distracted the Services from focusing on their inherent missions, requiring a host of 
operational tools unsuitable for traditional warfare. The defense enterprise’s deliberate 
departure from a COIN-intensive force reflects the need to recalibrate the force to 
effectively execute its designed mission areas. While a myopic focus on COIN has been 
an entirely necessary one, it has required a dramatic change in how the military is 
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manned, trained and equipped. As a result, the conventional military arena has been 
eclipsed by the operational requirements dictated by COIN, and the department’s 
divestiture of these capabilities reflects the need to restore conventional military 
capabilities.  In order to develop a sound argument, I will unravel how the military has 
augmented its manpower and strength and skill sets, training curriculums and 
modifications to equipment, and examine the Services’ decision calculus on divorcing 
themselves of these changes.   
To that end, I have divided this paper into three sections. The first section 
examines COIN theory and the critical ingredients for successfully executing COIN 
operations, and the difference between conventional and unconventional warfare. The 
second section will assess what types of investments the United States military has made 
during 21
st
 COIN campaigns and the futility of these augmented force structure changes 
and costs for high-end conventional kinetic warfare. Lastly, it will address the military’s 
appetite to divest these capabilities and investments in support of regaining full-spectrum 
combat capabilities at the culmination of COIN operations. This will shape my claim that 
COIN weakens the viability of the United States military. 
Definitions & Omissions 
I define COIN operations as comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to 
simultaneously defeat and contain an insurgency and address its root causes.
5
 I 
characterize United States military force structure by the way in which the Services man 
and organize, train and equip their forces. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed 
Forces of the United States, defines conventional (or traditional) warfare as “a 
confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states involving 
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small to large scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a 
variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, 




This paper will not address whether or not United States’ definition of 
conventional warfare is flawed. That is a separate theoretical discussion altogether. The 
more worthwhile undertaking is the exploration of the United States’ focus on COIN 
manifesting as a detriment to military conventional warfare health as currently defined.  
Literature Review 
Given the importance of securing the interests of the indigenous population in 
COIN operations, many policymakers and national security practitioners argue that COIN 
warfare has enhanced the efficacy of the United States military by restoring the human 
element in warfare.
7
 The need for a hyper-disciplined force has arguably yielded the 
finest officer corps the United States military has seen in decades. Concurrently fighting 
the Taliban, protecting the Afghan population and training the Afghan security forces 
requires unprecedented talent at the lowest tactical level. Yet, effectively executing this 
complex trifecta levies significant responsibility on the individual warfighter. Many 
argue that COIN unduly overbears junior offices given that United States COIN doctrine 
requires them to fulfill multiple roles—combatant, humanitarian worker, diplomat, 
government administrator—on the battlefield and determine when to interchange those 
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 Masterfully integrating a rigorous blend of tactics and strategy within American 
ground forces remains a challenge. 
The emphasis on COIN capabilities critical to carrying out the United States’ 
military campaign in Afghanistan undoubtedly transformed the way it has engendered 
warfighting readiness.  Not only do COIN operations demand disparate skill sets and 
mission requirements from a high-end conventional conflict, but they also generally 
require a lot more of them. David Galula proposes a force ratio of ten or twenty or higher 
to one between the counterinsurgent and insurgent, contending that COIN conflicts are 
cheap to start and very costly to preclude.
9
  
COIN operations have not only precipitated a spike in the sheer number of troops 
within the United States military, but they command both a change in force composition 
and the way in which it is utilized. However, the change in force packaging required by 
COIN operations is not a matter of shrinking or expanding units, it is about 
revolutionizing how these force packages think and operate. Winning the hearts and 
minds of an indigenous population requires kindness and ideology on the front lines; 
however, armed warriors are often times not appropriate vehicles to instill new beliefs.
10
 
John Nagl argues that, “conventional military forces are too prone to emphasize offensive 
actions such as capturing and killing terrorists rather than the predominately political, 
economic, and security requirements upon which the ultimate defeat of the insurgency 
depend.”
11
 The tactics and capabilities required for COIN warfare represent an aberration 
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from the conventional thinking that increased bloodshed to the enemy equates to victory, 
and the United States military has by and large resisted institutional change in providing 
ground forces for Afghan deployments. For instance, the Army’s defiance in creating 
specialized units and continued application of its conventional brigade-centric structure 
yields ineffective employment of those forces.
12
  
Realists share similar convictions with regard to the misfit between COIN as an 
operational approach and United States political objectives. They are incredulous of 
COIN warfare as they perceive it as inconsequential in the scheme of great power politics 
and wasteful because such efforts rarely succeed or are sustainable.
13
 The magnitude and 
duration of the use of force required for COIN operations is disproportional to the 
political objectives of the United States. Counter to the imperialist and neo-conservative 
opinion that COIN warfare promotes strong leadership and a positive global influence, 
realists favor the use of force only in pursuit of national interest.
14
 COIN operations, in 
the eyes of realists, fall outside of the scope of projecting power and thus do not qualify 
for a significant exertion of force abroad.   
Conversely, many defense and policy analysts advocate for a COIN-heavy 
military given the strong likelihood that the United States will be engaged in similar 
unconventional conflicts in the future. Whether or not the United States fight these wars 
going forward, they argue, should determine the type and amount of COIN-specific 
capacity and capabilities. Clausewitz stated that war is a continuation of political 
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intercourse through other means.
15
 Because policymakers determine whether or not war 
is the appropriate course of action to pursue political gains or to strengthen American 
interests, it is a futile endeavor for the military to overtly shape its structure based on its 
preference for war. Many COINdinistas, an oft-used term referring to wonks and national 
security practitioners lauding COIN warfare, claim that the United States will inevitably 
fight unconventional wars given the fact that predominant threats to American security 
have been supplanted by rogue states, failed states, and non-state actors.
16
 As a result, 
they assert that the decision to intervene is outside of the Pentagon’s control and the 
department should ingrain COIN warfare within its primary mission focus.  
I conclude that COIN warfare detracts from the operational viability of United 
States military conventional warfare. Because the American way of fighting COIN 
warfare necessitates an accentuated focus on the human element of warfare and requires 
significant augmentation to force structure, it is counterproductive to the conventional 
nature of United States warfare. That said, because the American military is methodically 
designed to subvert any adversary by force-on-force engagement, COIN warfare is 
merely a deviation from these strategic aims given the importance of political, economic, 
and cultural interplay. The department’s divestiture of COIN capabilities from its force 
structure, however, represents the need to reinvigorate its conventional warfare 
capabilities that renders it the world’s most preeminent fighting force. Although COIN 
warfare and the capabilities required to fight it have not contributed to the health of 
conventional military readiness, the Services’ departure from it is a prudent decision.  
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Method and Data 
Given the robust and oftentimes contradictory nature of COIN warfare, I dedicate 
a thorough background to COIN fundamentals. I leverage COIN theorists and 
assumptions that underline the American way of fighting unconventional wars, and 
provide a broad context in which COIN operations are conducted.  
To understand the effects of COIN warfare on United States’ conventional 
military readiness, I will use Afghanistan (and Iraq where the data is not discernible from 
each other) as the backdrop for making my argument. Because overseas contingency 
operations costs in support of these wars have remained disentangled from the annual 
baseline defense budgets, the investments specifically made for 21
st
 century COIN 
operations are entirely distinguishable from “business as usual” investments. Specifically, 
I will decompose COIN warfare investments in personnel, training and equipment arenas 
using Congressional budget documents and departmental doctrine and policy guidance. 
Where appropriate, I use Service-specific publications used to prioritize operational 
requirements.  
In discussing force structure and investments that the Department of Defense has 
made in support of COIN operations in the 21
st
 century, I will focus mainly on ground 
forces (i.e. Army and Marine Corps). While the Air Force has provided substantial 
amounts of close air support and medical evacuation and the Navy contributed 
expeditionary forces (e.g. construction battalions), the most palpable augmentation to 




COIN Theory and its Departure from Conventional Warfare 
Understanding the fundamental principles and theoretical underpinnings of COIN 
warfare is critical in understanding how this type of warfare diverges from conventional 
warfare. The goals of both the insurgents and counterinsurgents are different than 
opposing forces in a conventional conflict, and thus the means in which to defeat one 
another are misaligned from the conventional wisdom of war. Specifically, the goal of an 
insurgent is to make the nature of the conflict asymmetrical; where insurgents need very 
little to accomplish a lot and the counterinsurgents need a lot to accomplish very little.
17
 
Insurgents groups are allotted the luxury of having meticulous knowledge of the terrain, 
political structure, and cultural and tribal intricacies and thus contain an unequivocal 
advantage over the counterinsurgents. Leveraging this home field advantage yet 
simultaneously acknowledging that the counterinsurgent is more capable and powerful as 
a unified force requires the insurgents to act not as a nucleus of army bands spread across 
specific geographical parameters, but rather as an “armed clandestine organization.”
18
 
Conversely, the primary goal of the counterinsurgent is soliciting and maintaining 
the legitimacy of the host nation government and marginalizing the influence of the 
insurgency.
19
 Naturally, the goal of the counterinsurgent is much more difficult to 
accomplish given the complexity of restoring order versus defying it. The invariable 
determinant of the counterinsurgency’s success lies in legitimacy, and the key to gaining 
legitimacy is gaining trust of the population that renders it such. Only when the host 
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nation government can ensure security, provide access to essential services, and protect 
their cultural identity can it assure the ultimate demise of the insurgency.
20
  
In order for the counterinsurgents to wholly subvert the efforts of the insurgents to 
undermine the government’s legitimacy, they must apply an exorbitant amount of force. 
Counterinsurgencies are inherently manpower intensive and depend heavily upon 
specialized skill sets—to include civil affairs, police, public health, foreign language and 
cultural expertise, training and advising indigenous forces, and psychological warfare—
that are ancillary to the prosecution of conventional warfare.
21
 Furthermore, the means in 
which intelligence is utilized is markedly disparate from the standard conduct of war. 
Major General Michael Flynn, the former Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (CJ2), for 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, asserts that 
intelligence gathering should focus on the entire operational environment, specifically the 
political, economic and cultural aspects, instead of solely on the tactics and techniques 
subscribed to by the enemy.
22
  
Most importantly, the dichotomy in the theoretical undertones between COIN 
warfare and conventional warfare must be understood before examining the effect that 
COIN has on conventional warfare readiness. As explained earlier, the goal of the 
counterinsurgent is to bolster the perception of the host nation government in the eyes of 
its people and create a holistically stabilized environment; the goal of the conventional 
warrior, on the other hand, is conflict is to seize control of enemy territory and annihilate 
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the forces contained within it.
23
 This same paradigm cannot be applied to COIN warfare 
as the enemy is ubiquitous and unconstrained to defined parameters. A second important 
distinction between the two camps of war is that conventional warfare assumes that either 
side can initiate the conflict. In revolutionary warfare, however, only the insurgent can 
spark the war.
24
 Thus, the counterinsurgents are by default a reactive force born as the 
effect of the insurgency. Thirdly, and arguably the most notable delineation drawn 
between conventional and unconventional war involves the degree in which force is 
applied in order to defeat the enemy. In conventional war, the scheme of maneuver for 
operational progression is linear:  a front line that advances as enemy units are destroyed, 
territory held by the enemy is captured, and enemy capitals are seized.
25
 COIN warfare 
follows no structured progression into enemy territory. 
Unfortunately, indicators of operational success are more opaque given the 
diffuse nature of the enemy. Unlike conventional wars, the battlefield for COIN is 
amongst the population to which everyone, not just the combatants, has access.
26
 
Therefore, the decisive use of force prescribed for conventional warfare is inappropriate 
and counterproductive for the counterinsurgents. David Galula contends that, 
“Conventional operations [in counterinsurgencies] by themselves have at best no more 
effect than a fly swatter.”
27
 Hence, it is the conflicting and often contradictory tactics and 
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strategy of COIN compared to conventional warfare that marginalizes its utility in 
building conventional competence of the United States military.   
Changes and Investments in United States’ Force Structure for 21
st
Century COIN 
Campaigns and their Utility for High-End Conventional Warfare 
 
Due to the fact that the department could apply few conventional tactics to the 
ostensibly unconventional COIN campaign in Afghanistan, it heavily invested in force 
structure and specialized capabilities to ensure operational success in subverting the 
Taliban.  The increase in American troop levels compounded with comprehensive 
mission sets required for COIN operations has yielded a substantial price tag. The 
Department of Defense alone has spent 445 billion dollars on the war in Afghanistan 
through FY2012.
28
 This equates to an average of 1.2 million dollars per soldier for the 
war in Afghanistan.
29
 Put differently, with troop levels reaching 100,000 in 2010 with a 
yearly estimated cost of approximately 30 billion dollars, the United States has 
committed around 1,000 soldiers and 300 million dollars a year for each Taliban 
fighter.
30
 Several factors triggered the need for additional forces and capabilities on the 
battlefield, all of which directly contribute to the unique aspects of COIN practices.  
Personnel and Critical Skills 
The intrinsic struggle between the insurgents and American forces is predicated 
upon a war of attrition; victory for either one cannot be won immediately.
31
 Hence the 
recipe for success involves sound ingredients for sustainability. In order to ensure a 
viable operational campaign to subvert a relentless enemy, the United States military has 
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increased its number of ground forces.  At the end of 2012, the Army’s active duty end 
strength reached 547,000 and the Marine Corps has bolstered its active duty troop 
numbers to over 202,000, a 13% and 16% increase, respectively, since the September 
11th attacks.
32
 Due to the protracted nature of COIN warfare and the associated 
ambiguity of decisive defeat, the military re-oriented its deployment strategies in order to 
maintain a steady operational flow in theater. United States troop levels in Iraq and 
Afghanistan peaked at 187,900 in 2008, and even though this figure was tempered due to 
the drawdown of forces and Iraq, the surge in Afghanistan in 2009 required a sustained 
troops level average of 63,500 until the end of 2012.
33
 In order to maintain this 
operational tempo, the Army both increased the number of brigade combat teams (BCTs) 
from 33 to 43 and implemented a rotational readiness model to ensure continuity of 
heavy ground support.
34
 The Marine Corps has adopted a similar cyclical structure. 
Moreover, about 59% of the Army’s personnel growth is attributed to key capability 
areas including military police, military intelligence, engineers, medical, explosive 
ordnance disposal, and information operations.
35
 Similarly, the Marine Corps has 
increased the number of civil affairs and intelligence billets since 2004.
36
 
However, the growth in the Army and the Marine Corps to sustain ground 
operations in Afghanistan will undoubtedly be reversed given the department’s renewed 
focus on high-end conventional warfare. The Army and the Marine Corps have heralded 
plans to reduce their personnel strength to 490,000 and 182,000, respectively, by 
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 Furthermore, the Army plans to reinvigorate firepower and target destruction 
capabilities critical to the Army’s core functions that have been considerably 
overshadowed by the need for inflated force levels in securing population centers and 
infrastructure, providing humanitarian assistance, and facilitating delivery of essential 
services.
38
 The Army and Marine Corps’ plans to recalibrate their end strength to levels 
similar to pre-9/11 indicates that the augmented troops for COIN operations in 
Afghanistan are inexpedient in regaining conventional warfare capabilities.  
Not only has the need for persistent and sustained presence in Afghanistan for the 
last twelve years required an influx of additional United States troops, but it also dictated 
a mix of capabilities not typically organic within the department. As articulated in COIN 
theory, the paradoxical foundation of using combat force to create a peaceful and secure 
state precipitated the United States military to radically shift its tactical conduct in 
Afghanistan. Specifically, the need to inculcate United States soldiers within the Afghan 
population required the need to grow a cadre of language-capable and culturally aware 
personnel. David Kilcullen argues that linguistic and cultural competence in COIN 
warfare is a critical combat capability given that it “generates a permissive operating 
environment and enables access to cultural centers of gravity, situational awareness and 
interaction with the population.”
39
  
In addition to manufacturing a core of language and culturally-attuned military 
personnel to effectively interact with and conduct human intelligence among the Afghan 
population, the Department of Defense invested in building a sector of advisors.  As of 
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December 2012, approximately 250 United States Army and Marine Corps advisor teams 
have been operating in Afghanistan.
40
 Security force assistance teams are generally 
comprised of 9 to 18 advisor personnel made up of a mix of company and field-grade 
officers, and senior non-commissioned officers, and are tailored to match the needs of 
their Afghan counterparts. Additionally, more than 700 men and women of the 438th Air 
Expeditionary Wing have been re-missioned to train, equip, and mentor all levels of the 
Afghan Air Force.
41
 Given the emphasis on nation building and erecting a tenable 
security force, the military placed a greater emphasis on the need to support, train and 
advise the indigenous population that is key to long-term institutional stability. They are 
embedded within the government sector, to include the Afghan Ministries of Defense and 
the Interior in Kabul, and they are also operating alongside their tactical unit equivalents 
to provide support with regard to security techniques. Between 8,000 and 12,500 United 




While these advisors have contributed markedly to the overarching United States-
led campaign in Afghanistan, advisor skill sets do not typically fare well at the promotion 
boards. The Army for instance tends to promote officers that have commanded combat 
units, such as infantry, armor or aviation battalions.
43
  The career advancement of 
military personnel who have performed well in building rapport, entrenching themselves 
in a foreign culture, and operating effectively with minimal direction in Afghanistan is 
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more or less limited. This is also evidenced by the institutional current proving too strong 
for many in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, and many “Hands” did not return 
to Afghanistan for a second tour as a result.
44
 Yet after twelve years of continuous COIN-
focused that has resulted in a seasoned force with the experience and aptitude working as 
foreign advisers, human intelligence professionals, linguists, and development workers, 
the department plans to erase this nucleus of generated talent. As the Army and Marines 
begin to cut around 100,000 personnel during the next few years, political and defense 
leaders have announced plans to retain an expansible, experienced force that can be 
reconstituted rapidly in the event of a major conventional conflict.
45
 The department’s 
focus on re-modeling the force given the growth of conventional threats lends credence to 
its plans to divest itself of the unique capabilities to conduct COIN operations. The 
promotion boards serve as powerful messaging instruments in relaying what the Services 
value for war. 
Another substantial shift involving force composition pertains to the heavy 
reliance on the reserve component. Critical enablers and logistics assets critical to 
sustaining the COIN fight in Afghanistan largely reside in the reserve component, 
including civil affairs capabilities.
46
 Since 9/11, over 800,000 reservists have been 
mobilized in support of COIN operations.
47
 Yet the continual deployments to 
Afghanistan have levied onerous requirements on the reserve component, and have often 
times exceeded deployment to dwell policies. More problematic is that the department’s 
dependence on the reserve component will not only persist, but in fact increase as it 
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prepares to rebalance. The new strategic guidance issued by the department in January 
2012 emphasizes the need to maintain a ready and capable reserve force by utilizing its 
years of war experience to meet a growing set of security challenges in the 21st century.
48
 
What this assertion conveniently ignores is that the reserve component has inherently 
more parochial mission requirements and contains different plan assumptions than those 
applied to the active component. While the reserve forces called upon for duty for COIN-
centric warfare for the last twelve years has proved valuable, their core mission areas 
make them ill-suited to provide significant combat capabilities for high-end conventional 
warfare.  
Training and Preparedness 
The department has virtually transformed its training platforms in order to prepare 
forces to deploy in support of COIN operations in the Middle East. Specifically, the 
Army and the Marine Corps have implemented dramatic changes in its training 
curriculums from the individual professional military education levels up to large-scale 
mission rehearsal exercises prior to deployment. Not only have COIN principles moved 
to the forefront in battlefield exercises over the last twelve years, but also to the head of 
military classrooms as well. Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC), for 
example, used to include about 30 hours worth of COIN course work for majors; as of 
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More dramatically, the Army and the Marine Corps have spent billions of dollars 
in cultivating realistic culminating exercises for deploying units by emulating the 
operational environment in Iraq and Afghanistan and incorporating insurgent techniques 
required for them to counter. The Army’s two Combined Training Centers in the United 
States and the Marine Corps’ Air Ground Combat Center have focused solely on 
operational requirements for COIN, to include incorporating Afghan role models and 
simulated improved explosive devices.
50
 The Marine Corps restructured its Enhanced 




The training overhaul orchestrated by the United States military to prepare its 
forces for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade has produced an 
expert force in COIN and stability operations. However, this heavy concentration towards 
a narrowed capability area has detracted from the conventional readiness of the military, 
specifically Army and Marine Corps forces. Core competencies unique to these Services 
have suffered skill atrophy, and their most recent training plans once again underscore a 
departure from a focus on COIN to high-end kinetic warfare. Specifically, the Army is 
beginning to experience severe degradation in its ability to integrate fires with 
maneuver.
52
 Over 90% of fire supporters are serving outside of their primary skill 
specialty and thus uncertified.
53
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In 2012, the Army published its revised training strategy titled “Army Doctrine 
Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations to regain focus on combined arms maneuver 
and wide area security.
54
 In order to adhere to these doctrinal prescriptions, the Army 
recently began revamping its brigade-level training exercises to emphasis commander-
based training and reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) in 
austere environments required for conventional force-on-force engagements.
55
 Similarly, 
the Marine Corps is replacing the Mojave Viper training exercise with the Integrated 
Training Exercise, which places a renewed focus on synchronizing combat ground, air 
and logistics forces in a combined arms event.
56
 Moreover, starting in 2011 after the 
announcement of the United States troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Marine Corps 
and the Navy teamed up for a joint brigade-level training exercise named Bold Alligator 
to conduct amphibious operations for the first time in 10 years.
57
 The Marine Corps’ 
renovated training paradigm places renewed energy on combined arms maneuver, 
mountain, jungle and amphibious warfare which all underpin the essence of the Marine 
Corps.  
The ostensible shift in training priorities within the Army and the Marine Corps 
highlight the significance in value between conventional warfare and COIN warfare. 
While live fire exercises have been overshadowed by an acute focus on stability 
operations exercises have diminished a broad range of military capability over the last 
twelve years, the department is in the process of reversing this phenomenon. The military 
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Services must uphold their ability to subvert adversaries that have the potential to employ 
like capabilities, a concept that bellies the theoretical basis of COIN warfare. Ultimately, 
the impetus behind the department’s restoration of conventional military training is that it 
reinforces what it knows it does well. Military preparation for COIN warfare required the 
Services to pigeonhole much of its combat capability, but the resurgence of high intensity 
combat operations as evidenced by their new training plans speaks to their importance.   
Equipping our Force  
Although many of the investments the department has made in readiness over the 
last decade are manpower-focused given the non-kinetic techniques surrounding COIN 
operations, it is important to note the department has given considerable pecuniary 
attention to equipment for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 2008, Congress provided 
$16.8 billion to buy the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles in supplemental 
overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds to counteract the growing threat of IEDs.
58
 
Furthermore, the overuse of equipment coupled with the unforgiving terrain in which 
these equipment sets are being operated breeds substantial costs to maintain mission-
capable equipment. In 2012, for instance, the department requested $11.9 billion for 
equipment reset – the cost of repairing, rebuilding and replacement equipment in support 
of operations in Afghanistan.
59
  
However, the investments in acquiring and procuring equipment tailored for the 
operational environment in Afghanistan falls outside the confines of the department’s 
business as usual acquisition process, and they have done little to interrupt long-term 
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Service recapitalization and modernization plans. Procurement funding in the FY2012 
base defense budget request was $113 billion, an increase of approximately 10 percent 
from the FY2011 base budget.
60
 Not only has the department segregated equipment 
funding specifically for COIN operations in the Middle East from its baseline budget, but 
its desire to modernize aligns with its desire to restore conventional weapons as its front 
line of defense. In the height of American embroilment in Iraq, the budget request for 
FY2008 prioritized traditional weapons programs and moving ahead with the vast 
majority of the acquisition programs included in the Services’ long-range plans, the 
majority of which were also projected in the last Clinton Administration defense plan 
prior to September 11th.
61
 
The standard acquisition plans and decisions made throughout the last decade 
separate from those made to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan exhibit the 
department’s perception of COIN as shortsighted. Equipment requirements for COIN 
warfare are wholly disparate from those required to execute high intensity combat 
operations, and thus do not contribute to conventional military readiness. Yet the 
investments made in customizing end items required for Iraq and Afghanistan, such as 
MRAPs, lose relevance in the department’s demarcation from large-scale COIN 
operations. Separating these niche investments from standard business practices within 
the budget process highlights the fact that military perceives conventional acquisition as 
indispensible in maintaining superiority over the enemy. COIN requirements are strictly 
additive, not complementary, to the capital-intensive nature of conventional warfare. 
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COIN in the Department’s Rear-View Window 
The department has conducted a massive overhaul of its ground force that has 
manifested in new capabilities inorganic to the force yet critical in ensuring success in the 
Iraq and Afghan wars. However, given the department’s fiscal priorities in obscuring the 
role of COIN-specific skill assets and illuminating the strategic placement of 
conventional high-end capabilities at the drawdown of these wars, this overhaul is 
ephemeral at best. The department’s plan to shrink the increased manpower figures 
comparable to 9/11 numbers, re-orient training programs to emphasis core competencies 
unique to both the Army and Marine Corps, and continue the growth of major acquisition 
programs underscores the futility of COIN in support of conventional warfare readiness. 
For instance, current discourse within the department suggests that the Army’s security 
force assistance training brigade at the Joint Readiness Training Center and the Air 
Force’s Air Advisor Academy at Fort Dix will be cut entirely.
62
  
It is the confluence of the department’s strategy to re-shape its personnel, training 
and the department’s handling of fiscal planning over the last twelve years that renders 
COIN warfare a detraction from conventional spheres of war. The department has paid 
for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan war funding with a separate pot of money from the 
defense budget, and has been excluded in the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP), the 
five-year budget landscape proposed by the Services.
63
 The salience of this is two-fold. 
For one, the department has bifurcated the funding available for fighting the COIN 
campaigns in Afghanistan from baseline funding, which includes peacetime operations, 
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procurement, R&D, etc. The department’s standard business practices, to include 
preparing for major theater war, do not include large-scale COIN conflicts. Secondly, by 
not including OCO funds in out-year budget plans, the department has consciously 
refrained from pecuniary planning of these COIN-centric operations. The funds 
appropriated for COIN operations over the last decade are predicated on the department’s 
reactive posture to the conflicts versus the proactive posture assumed by conventional 
manning, training and equipment requirements.  If the department saw strategic utility in 
retaining COIN investments and capabilities after these wars culminated, the fiscal 
accounting between COIN and conventional warfare would have become 
indistinguishable.    
The Defense Strategic Guidance promulgated in January 2012 by President 
Obama and former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reinforces the United States’ 
strategic priorities in the midst of the impending drawdown in Afghanistan and declining 
resources. The new strategy states, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-
scale, prolonged stability operations” and stresses the need to reinstate the combat 
capabilities required for a broad set of contingencies.
64
 Key investments in the realm of 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, countering anti-access/area denial 
strategies, and countering weapons of mass destruction typify the department’s priorities 
given their kinetic preponderance.   
Yet, the reality of the matter is that America’s conventional military superiority 
has been predicated on its ability to deliver quick, cheap, and decisive success since the 
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 The department is innately predisposed to employ traditional conventional 
military operations, and its behavior towards fighting COIN operations further 
underscores its lack of malleability against an unlike enemy. The department’s regression 
from COIN operations indicates it has placed too high of an emphasis on nation-building 
as a fighting tool rather than fighting itself. The department’s current and planned 
investments gives fidelity to its perception that the core principle of fighting should be 
augmented by the capabilities required to succeed in nation-building missions rather than 
vice versa.
66
 Put more plainly, the United States military will once again place the lavish 
use of firepower at the forefront of the battlefield by leading first with advanced weapon 
systems and not with its people.
67
 This shift in paradigm is indicative in its reorientation 
of investments in manning, training and equipment towards high-end conventional 
combat in order to secure its role as a unipolar hegemon.  
Conclusion 
The Department of Defense has perceived 21st century COIN warfare as a 
protracted obligation rather than as an opportunity to refine its role in a highly complex 
and irregular world. As a result, military conventional readiness has suffered, and the 
department’s augmented capabilities and corresponding investments are feckless in 
confronting similarly equipped adversaries. The theoretical underpinning of COIN 
requires a separate set of combat capabilities within the United States’ military and a 
strategic shift away from kinetic supremacy. The United States has acquired tailored skill 
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sets and adapted its force to effectively execute these unconventional wars in such a way 
that it can deliberately reverse its actions. The United States ground force has 
undoubtedly garnered invaluable experience in Afghanistan, but that vigor will be re-
packaged towards recovering conventional warfare capabilities. 
It is evident that the department aspires to migrate away from COIN warfare and 
its associated investments in order to reinstall conventional warfare as the face of the 
United States military. The recent doctrinal and resourcing shifts underscore the 
department’s de-emphasis on COIN and the need to regain conventional military 
readiness as evidenced by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. The department’s 
fixation on conventional capabilities, however, is predicated on its ability to control the 
enemy by employing weapons and kinetic assets and thus controlling the outcome of the 
conflict. The less compatible a partner culture is to America's, the harder it becomes to 
control COIN operations.
68
 For this reason, the department’s decision to re-mission its 
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How does the use of civilians on the battlefield affect the outcome of counterinsurgencies 
and has the United States miscalculated the proper mix of civilians and military 





In late 2010, comedian Kathleen Madigan visited Helmand Province, Afghanistan 
and recalled her encounter with a young Marine captain who emphatically shared with 
her his unit’s plans to build a school, establish a health clinic, and transform the local 
police force, among other things. As his list of ambitions continued to roll off his tongue, 
Madigan finally interjected and asked, “When are you going to invade Detroit?"
69
 This 
anecdote effectively illustrates that the American way of fighting counterinsurgencies 
requires a comprehensive, multi-dimensional force that is largely un-kinetic. Somewhat 
paradoxically, however, the Department of Defense has been the primary proponent for 
constructing this force.  
Of the roughly $1.2 trillion that has been appropriated for the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the military has received about 94%.
70
 The Department of State and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been allocated 
approximately $67 billion, comprising of about 5%.
71
 Although the United States has 
attempted to employ a whole-of-government approach for counterinsurgency operations 
in Afghanistan, it has failed by placing too much emphasis on the military component 
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and not enough on the civilian. General Petraeus’ masterpiece, Field Manual 3-24 
“Counterinsurgency,” states that as a counterinsurgency campaign is successfully 
prosecuted, the "government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds 
legitimacy through effective governance, and can manage and meet the expectations of 
the nation's entire population."
72
 The complexity and the number of roles levied upon US 
soldiers exhausted their ability to fight and debilitated US strategic effectiveness. The US 
needed to leverage a proportionately larger number of civilians. Having done so would 
have likely prolonged the political tolerance of the United States’ involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The United States military is by and large ill-suited to house the entirety of 
the counterinsurgency portfolio, as it should reside primarily within a myriad of civilian-
dominated organizations. 
Literature Review 
  The US has put forth exorbitant amounts of time and resources towards the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the counterinsurgency campaigns it has engendered to 
achieve its strategic objectives transcend conventional military operational requirements.  
Many recognize the increased need for civilians on the counterinsurgency battlefield due 
to the fact that these conflicts are centered on the control of the indigenous civilians. Over 
the past few years, there has been a considerable uptick in the civilian presence in 
Afghanistan. Specifically, the number of Department of State and United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) civilians increased from 531 to 1,300 between 
January 2009 and June 2011, and the total is projected to rise to 1,450 civilians operating 
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in the region by mid-2014.
73
  This in large part is due to the escalating focus on 
transitioning security operations to the Afghans, thereby transferring many of the 
functions performed by the US military to the civilian sector.  
Yet prior to the promulgation of US drawdown plans, several initiatives were 
underway to increase the role of civilians within the Middle East counterinsurgency 
efforts. In 2009, the State Department began building a Civilian Response Corps, a 250-
member team comprised of nonmilitary personnel who could serve as first responders to 
conduct reconstruction and stability operations in foreign countries.
74
  The tailored force 
was able to draw personnel from Departments of State, Agriculture, Justice, Homeland 
Security, Commerce, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and the USAID. The idea 
for an expeditionary force of civilians emanated from the aftermath of the US invasion in 
Iraq, when critics accused the US of being ill-prepared to “win the peace.”
75
 While the 
Corps was established to help alleviate the military of extraneous duties required by 
counterinsurgency operations, its assistance in these efforts remains very limited.  
Additionally, President Obama heralded an effort, the Civilian Expeditionary 
Workforce (CEW), to expand US civilian presence in support of building governance and 
security capacity in Afghanistan in 2009. This workforce, under the authority of the 
Department of Defense, was charged with training and equipping groups of civilians to 
provide security, ensure access to basic services, and stimulate economic development.
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Perhaps most widely recognized as the hallmark of US civilian-military 
integration in 21
st
 century counterinsurgencies is the establishment of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Derived from the experience of US military civil affairs 
teams operating in Afghanistan, PRTs were espoused to help expedite national 
reconstruction efforts and influence the new and fragile Karzai government in early 
2003.
77
 PRTs initially consist of security forces, special operators, and troves of civilians 
from the USAID, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of State. These task-
organized cells embedded themselves in Afghan society, and were assigned with projects 




 While many academics believe these civilian enhancements on the 
counterinsurgency battlefield have proved to be expedient endeavors, they often times 
view their shortcomings as eclipsing their success. For instance, many PRTs have a 
disproportionately low number of civilian personnel to military personnel. In January 
2009, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported that there 
were 1,021 military personnel and only 35 civilians in all US PRTs in Afghanistan.
79
 This 
speaks to a larger issue of US civilian agencies simply lacking the end strength capacity 
during protracted and intricate stability operations. The two primary interagency partners 
germane to the Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction portfolio—
Department of State and USAID—are relatively small organizations with a constrained 
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ability to rapidly deploy capabilities in support of large-scale, complex operations.
80
 For 
example, the organic capacity of the Army in stability operations (e.g. civil affairs 
personnel) outnumbers the capacity of Department of State and USAID.
81
 
 While many critics share the concern that the US has not given civilian 
organizations due diligence within the counterinsurgency landscape, very few actually 
refutes their invaluable utility. In fact, civilians playing primary versus supporting roles 
in US counterinsurgency campaigns has been espoused by the Department of Defense 
and codified within joint doctrine. In December 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel & Readiness promulgated a Directive-Type Memorandum titled, 
Counterinsurgency Training and Reporting Guidance for Preparing U.S. Forces to 
Succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, directing interagency partners’ assessments to be 
incorporated within established Department of Defense reporting, planning, and 
assessment processes.
82
 Coinciding with the recognition to fuse interagency efforts with 
those of the military is the need to better operationalize civilians –such as those within 
the Department of State and USAID – to succeed in combat and austere environments. In 
an attempt to make it more combat-capable, USAID engendered the Office of Military 
Affairs in 2005, renamed Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation in 2011, which 
provides the focal point for synthesizing USAID and Department of Defense planning, 
training, education and policy.
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 In fact, staunch proponents for civilians serving as the primary warriors within 
counterinsurgencies submit that their effectiveness in injecting humanitarian, economic, 
and development assistance to gain the support of the local population actually surpasses 
military efforts. There is a growing consensus that the indigenous population responds 
more favorably to the restoration of good governance and programs involving social and 
economic equities more so than the provision of aid and development provided by the 
military.
84
 Military personnel can be useful in facilitating the delivery of aid given the 
decentralized and expansive parameters of counterinsurgencies; however many posit that 
US civilians should be responsible for their implementation. Moreover, the missions 
endemic to US civilian agencies, such as Department of State and USAID, are oriented to 
bolstering the long-term stability and security of nations vulnerable to insurgents. 
Anthony Cordesman, renowned national security analyst at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, argues, “You can’t win where you do not go and stay…we begin to 
lose when we take over.” Thus, it is asserted that US civilian agencies are better postured 
to sustain long-term operations endemic to the American way of fighting 
counterinsurgencies, and their smaller and non-kinetic footprint deprives them of the 
temptation to overextend themselves. 
It is no surprise that national security scholars and practitioners advocating for a 
higher degree of civilian inculcation within counterinsurgency operations are in turn 
ostensibly wary of US military involvement in these conflicts. David Kilcullen contends 
that military force can only create pre-conditions for non-military measures to succeed, 
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and they should leave the conflict once the bullets stop flying.
85
 Furthermore, Karl 
Eikenberry, retired United States Army lieutenant general and former U.S. ambassador to 
Afghanistan, candidly stated:  
It was sheer hubris to think that American military personnel without the 
appropriate language skills and with only a superficial understanding of 
Afghan culture could, on six- or 12-month tours, somehow deliver to 




Some argue that the application of large amounts of military personnel within 
counterinsurgencies is paradoxically inappropriate given they are unwanted by the 
indigenous people. Firepower and cash are not fitting weaponry and do not bode well for 
the US attempting to achieve strategic political outcomes. Jeffrey Record maintains that 
transforming military victories into political ones are not only challenging, but fatal. 
Moreover, it overlooks the recognition that insurgencies are first and foremost inherently 
political struggles.
87
 Therefore, US military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
been a force of misalignment. The theoretical composition of counterinsurgencies, the 




 Conversely, other analysts and academics maintain that the Department of 
Defense should in fact retain the multifaceted operational capabilities to remain viable to 
execute counterinsurgencies. In 2005, the Department codified short-term and long-term 
goals for stability operations within Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, 
Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
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Operations that included providing security and restoring essential services, garnering 
enduring and viable market economies, and promoting the rule of law.
89
 Many argue 
because the nature of these conflicts involve a considerable amount of combat capacity 
for security purposes, the military must be engaged in post-conflict operations as much as 
they are involved intra-conflict. 
More fervent military enthusiasts posit that the military should transform its 
capability repertoire to fight protracted wars aimed at nation building and countering 
insurgencies in the future. John Nagl, author of the renowned book “Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife,” contends that the majority of the conflicts facing the US within the next 50 
years will emanate from an “Arc of Instability” within the greater Middle East and parts 
of Africa and Central and South Asia, under which irregular warfare will become quite 
regular.
90
 To mitigate the challenges associated with the high propensity that many of US 
adversaries will be insurgents, America’s armed forces must change. Even with 
operations in Iraq complete and the drawdown of US ground forces in Afghanistan 
underway, there is still an appetite among COINdinistas to preserve and even grow 
counterinsurgency skills and capacity. Many war wonks support the notion that it is the 
intrinsic responsibility of the military to cultivate fragile states in order to ensure our own 
future security. Specifically, they advocate for redistributing investments in special 
operations forces to grow more capacity for “indirect action.”
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However, it is insufficient interagency coordination capability more so than 
military miscalculations and civilian capacity shortfalls that is most conspicuous in the 
counterinsurgency literature. Michele Flourney, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, asserts that the US government lacks the mechanisms required to synchronize the 
multitude of agencies at all levels, both in Washington and on the front lines.
92
 
Specifically, she notes that the National Security Council is undermanned to both 
effectively facilitate the development of whole-of-government plans and oversee the 
deployment of the interagency operations already underway.
93
  Furthermore, convoluted 
fiscal authority between US agencies exacerbates the ambiguity associated with a diverse 
counterinsurgency fighting force.  
What is lacking in the literature is exactly how authorities and resources could be 
redefined and reallocated respectively to optimize the role of civilians within US-led 
counterinsurgencies. While the military should lead the initiative to shape the region or 
state in preparation for sustained development and stability post-conflict, it is the 
civilians that must be emboldened to execute those plans. Proposals to realign elements 
of institutional power within the US government civilian agencies are relatively sparse. 
Civilian-military cells, such as Civil-Military Operations Centers, Civilian-Military 
Centers, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers, and PRTs have generated 
varying degrees of success, but they are all piecemeal solutions that were never intended 
to redress the larger whole-of-government infusion issues.
94
  The US government 
unambiguously has the capacity and skills to conduct counterinsurgency operations the 
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way in which it subscribes to fighting them; however, these ingredients are too diffuse 
across multiple agencies to serve as a united counterinsurgency force.  
Method and Data 
This paper references a host of policy statements, news releases, congressional 
reports, and US government officials and reports to reinforce the argument made in 
support of increased civilian involvement within counterinsurgencies. Specifically, the 
analysis decomposes the role of the Department of State and USAID in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the success and challenges in the two conflicts. It also includes 
the whole-of-government initiatives engendered within these agencies to further 
counterinsurgency objectives, and how capabilities required for fighting US 
counterinsurgency operations inherently exist within soft power agencies more so than 
within the military.  
Case Studies 
The role of USAID in US Middle East counterinsurgencies 
 The US Agency for International Development (USAID) serves as the linchpin 
for promoting economic growth, democracy, and smart governance worldwide, and thus 
has been a critical component of executing US counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. It is the predominant conduit for development assistance and plays a pivotal role in 
security-sector reform. This includes stability and reconstruction, counter-narcotics, law 
enforcement among other activities.
95
 Because USAID contains such a prolific portfolio 
with close collaboration with several organizations, such as US Drug Enforcement 
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the US Customs and Border Protection, 
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roles and responsibilities are often times muddied. While this reflects the comprehensive 
nature of fighting counterinsurgencies, the mission of USAID cannot be overstated.   
 Today, USAID operates in more than 100 countries across the globe, and has 
been actively pursuing global development and sustainment for over 65 years.
96
Although 
providing foreign aid has been the agency’s modus operandi since its inception, the US 
aid framework has undergone a significant transformation in the aftermath of 9/11. The 
2002 National Security Strategy, released by the White House, established for the first 
time global development, a primary objective of US foreign aid, as a third pillar of US 
national security, commensurate with defense and diplomacy.”
97
 Given the emphasis on 
bolstering political, economic and security platforms in US-style counterinsurgencies, 
USAID has been an invaluable player in Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, Afghanistan 
remained the top recipient of total US economic and military assistance, totaling 12.9 
billion dollars, from 2007-2011; Iraq had held the premier spot from 2003–2007.
98
 While 
USAID spearheads foreign aid, namely humanitarian aid, the US Department of Treasury 
manages a technical assistance program that offers temporary financial advisors to 
countries reforming their economic foundations and combating insurgents, such as 
Afghanistan.
99
 Again, these roles, often closely shared with various agencies, can yield 
confusion in these complex operations.  
 The application of foreign aid in support of counterinsurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan represents a point of departure from the majority of assistance programs 
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 In the past decade, the preponderance of aid for development in Iraq 
and Afghanistan has been for constructing roads, schools, power plants, health clinics, 
and irrigation systems. In Iraq alone, more than $10 billion has gone towards economic 
infrastructure.
101
 Moreover, USAID invested considerably in education across 
Afghanistan, a critical ingredient for promoting democracy and directly combating the 
insurgents that seek to undermine it. It printed more than 97 million textbooks in 2011 for 
grades 1-12, trained more than 53,000 teachers, and built or refurbished 680 schools.
102
 
 While USAID is currently undertaking ostensibly ambitious development efforts 
in order to achieve US strategic goals in Afghanistan, it didn’t necessarily start off that 
way. USAID initially focused on humanitarian and short-term assistance, such as food 
assistance.
103
 Soon after, the agency recognized the magnitude of aid requirements for 
galvanizing economic growth, implementing effective governance, and creating a 
functioning workforce in order to weaken and defeat the Taliban. By 2008, USAID was 
orchestrating a litany of development programs, to include road construction and 
rehabilitation, electrical network improvements, credit and micro-credit programs, and 
privatization support for state-owned enterprises.
104
  
 Although USAID lacks a kinetic component that the Department of Defense 
single-handedly provides within counterinsurgencies, the aid and development programs 
spearheaded by USAID have proven to be a powerful weapon in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Its contribution to the fight outmatches what the military has attempted to do with its 
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unencumbered fiscal allowance, simply because USAID has performed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan much like it always has since its inception. The military, on the other hand, 
required an entire makeover for these conflicts. This notion is evident in the military’s 
implementation of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) that has 
provided commanders with tactical means to perform a host of stability tasks that have 
traditionally been conducted by US, foreign or host nation professional civilian personnel 
or agencies.
 105
 These tasks ranged from facilitating access to basic services, support to 
provincial leaders, and economic development projects. PRTs have been the biggest 
consumers of CERP funds, and they undoubtedly benefitted from the flexibility and rapid 
access associated with these funds. The nature of these funds differs drastically from 
those spent by USAID, which are subject to strict and mandatory oversight and 
reviews.
106
 However, the scrutiny associated with these funds forces discipline with 
regard to prioritizing and budgeting US development projects. This discipline has been 
largely absent in economic and security reconstruction efforts undertaken by the 
Department of Defense, and the lack of accountability and credibility in these functions 
has hampered progress within US counterinsurgency campaigns.   
Within counterinsurgencies, development aid is as important as ammunition and 
artillery shells; however, it is only success if economic, political and security 
improvements resulting from aid are sustainable. Long-term persistent engagement lies at 
the heart of US COIN doctrine, and USAID and its civilian workforce serves as this 
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 In fact, USAID in collaboration with the Department of State 
heralded its plans to Congress to resume a wide range of assistance in support of 
Pakistan’s fight against terrorism.
108
 This includes helping Pakistani law enforcement and 
a multibillion-dollar dam in disputed territory during an impeding period of vulnerability 
with US troop withdrawal in neighboring Afghanistan.”
109
 
The role of US Department of State in US Middle East counterinsurgencies 
 Much like USAID, the Department of State has played an instrumental role in 
executing holistic counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, it 
has heavily supported the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 
establishing a framework for a thriving populace, and governance that emphasizes 
democratic principles through a viable rule of law and high moral standards. The United 
States remains dedicated to helping Afghans implement their vision for a country that is 




The Department of State intensified its role in Afghanistan in 2009 when the 
administration and Congress recognized the need for an upsurge in civilian efforts to 
influence the Afghan governance domain. In response, the State Department stood up the 
Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under Ambassador 
Holbrooke, which provided a single office where civilians from various bureaus and 
agencies could exchange information and coordinate efforts.
 111
 Holbrooke also lead the 
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influx of hundreds of civilians into Afghanistan, both in the Embassy and in field 
positions for development projects along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
112
 In addition, 
Department of State crafted civilian-military operational plans for all twelve American 
PRTs in addition to developing plans for Regional Command East, for Regional 
Command South writ large.
113
 Furthermore, the State Department has played a palpable 
hand in helping Afghanistan prepare for its highly anticipated presidential election in 
2014.  
Perhaps the most recognized undertaking by the State Department is the 
development of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) to ensure long-term 
stability in Iraq and perpetuate US-Iraqi relations following the departure of American 
troops. Iraq serves as a strategic hub in securing US democratic values within the Middle 
East region, and OSC-I puts the role of US Department of State at the forefront.  
Unfortunately, much like USAID has experienced, the perennial money tree for direct 
civilian involvement in Afghanistan will soon be uprooted as the US scales down funding 
for operations and assistance in 2014.
 114
 Supplemental funding from Congress secures 
near-term investment, such as oversight activities and civilian protection but this will 
vanish in tandem with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
To complicate matters further, there have been notable missteps within the US 
whole-of-government efforts to clearly delineate responsibility between the State 
Department and the Defense Department. While the US initially planned for the State 
Department to assume key responsibilities after military operations ceased, it did not 
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receive adequate funding to perform all of the stipulated post-conflict tasks; this resulted 
in State requesting assistance from the presiding Combatant Command (U.S. Central 
Command) in charge of conducting military operations there to provide security and 
logistics support in enclaves where OSC-I personnel resided and the OSC-I conducted its 
activities.
 115
 This budget-induced dichotomy within OSC-I caused it to become directly 
and uniquely involved in supporting significant functions for both Departments that were 
essential for implementing both security cooperation and security assistance activities.  
 However, it was the profound dissidence on effectively scoping the OSC-I 
mission that jeopardizes the US from fully achieving full range of planned DoD security 
cooperation priorities.
 116
 Interagency tensions inhibited accomplishing efforts important 
to improving the Iraqi government’s security sector and enhancing bilateral security 
relations with Iraq. In fact, a U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General report 
released in September 2013 stated, “Disagreement between Department of State and 
Department of Defense officials detracted from overall unity of effort and resulted in 
mixed signals, confused mission objectives, and unclear lines of authority, particularly in 
Baghdad between the U.S. Mission and the OSC-I.”
117
 
OSC-I is but one example of a host of fiscal quagmires confronting the 
Department of State in support of the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. For 
instance, it took the State Department four years to garner the funds necessary from 
Congress to implement the Civilian Response Corps.
 118
  This program as mentioned 
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earlier held much promise for providing a robust force package containing civilians from 
various US agencies and organizations during the post-conflict era in Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, the failure of the US to manufacture a long-term Status of Force 
Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq in the aftermath of combat operations illustrates the 
complexities of establishing lines of authorities within counterinsurgencies. Like most 
SOFAs, the US-Iraq SOFA delineates rules and regulations regarding civil and criminal 
jurisdiction of US forces operating in country, weapon possession, uniform wearing, 
customs, taxes, entry/exit into Iraq, yet it differs from most SOFAs in having a concrete 
expiration date; the US-Iraq SOFA expired in December 31, 2011.
119
 The absence of a 
long-term SOFA compounds the challenges of securing fiscal support for stability 
operations within the confines of OSC-I.   
Not only have budget-related barricades and inter-Departmental strains adversely 
impacted progress in the Department of State’s ability to directly influence US 
counterinsurgency endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its institutional stigmas seem 
to be equally as problematic. The State Department’s John Herbst, former State 
Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who was primary 
frontrunner in staffing the civilian efforts in Afghanistan, admits that the department has 
“a substantial risk-averse culture when it comes to deploying its own civilians in an 





                                                        
119
 Chuck Mason, “U.S-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement,” Congressional Research Service, 
January 2011, p. 7. 
120
 “Waiting on a Civilian Surge in Afghanistan,” Interview with John Herbst, Council on Foreign 
Relations, March 2010. 
 50 
Analysis 
While the US framework for fighting counterinsurgency entails a multi-faceted 
campaign to combat political, economic, and security vulnerabilities susceptible to 
insurgent control, it has overextended itself militarily in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Persistent military deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have proven politically 
unpalatable in the long run, and ultimately resulted in a forcible exit plan for both 
counterinsurgency campaigns. Employing civilians within various agencies that already 
specialize in areas such as reconstruction, development, and societal changes, allows for 
the US to be engaged in these conflicts longer.    
The US strategic approach for Afghanistan is three-pronged, comprising of a 
military campaign against al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban insurgents; a civilian 
campaign to strengthen the political, economic and civil foundations; and an intensified 
diplomatic push to culminate conflict and facilitate a more secure future for the country. 
This strategy of “fight, talk, build,” as referred to by former Secretary of State Clinton, 
represents the political remedy to end conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and offers the 
best hope of peace and stability for the region.
121
  
The first of these three elements, however, has a tangible expiration date. It is the 
latter two efforts that capture the long-term plans to sustain and improve their security 
and governance practices that underpin US counterinsurgency principles. In fact, RAND 
Corporation conducted a study titled “How Insurgencies End” where it examined 89 
insurgencies and concluded that the median length of an insurgency is ten years, 
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generally tailing out to an end state of 16 years.
122
 Because of the lengthy timeline 
endemic to counterinsurgencies, it is difficult for policymakers to preserve political 
capital required to fully achieve US strategic end states. As a result, they must leverage 
the skill sets among civilian agencies whose missions already align with those needed in 
post-conflict shaping and reconstruction operations. A prolonged campaign will most 
likely yield higher political and public tolerance if it involves the expansion of civilian 
agencies’ roles versus the transformation of US military conduct. 
Furthermore, a sound and sustainable US civilian presence in Iraq post-conflict 
should have been at the forefront of the US proposal versus the remaining troop numbers. 
This would have increased the likelihood of an enduring Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) between US and Iraq if the US had downplayed the role of a continuing military 
presence and accentuated the utility of a larger civilian task-organized force focused on 
diplomacy and economic stability within the Iraqi state. Because civilians do not have the 
kinetic capabilities of military forces, a SOFA containing procedures for US personnel 
committing wrongdoings or transgressing Iraq authority would have been much easier to 
reach consensus with the Iraqi government.  
In order to succeed in its subscribed way of fighting counterinsurgencies, the US 
must adjust its warfighting fulcrum to empower civilian organizations so that their niche 
missions and capabilities can be translated into these conflicts. Department of State and 
USAID’s systemic underfunding has plagued effective planning, development assistance, 
and stabilization initiatives, and has robbed these pertinent civilian organizations of 
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 Thus, the Department of Defense should represent the bedrock of 
security support to civilians rather than spearheading holistic, whole-of-government 
operations that typify US counterinsurgencies. For instance, the Marine Corps provides 
support to the Department of State, codified through a Memorandum of Agreement 
between the Department of State and Defense, cited in the US Department of State 
Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 12 Diplomatic Security, that allows State principal 
officers or their designees to exert direct operational control of assigned Marine Corps 
personnel during diplomatic missions, such as guarding a US embassy abroad.
124
 The US 
should consider broadening this initiative and applying a similar paradigm to 
counterinsurgency operations in order to provide the necessary security support to 
civilian teams. Although force protection has posed a series of challenges for civilian 
warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, enhancing funding authorities within State and 
USAID would streamline security augmentation requirements levied on the Department 
of Defense and improve the efficacy of economic development, security and diplomatic 
endeavors in counterinsurgency campaigns. 
Conclusion 
While US efforts to amalgamate civilian-based humanitarian, economic and 
stability activities within its operational counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are laudable, the applied number of civilians and military personnel remains 
an imbalanced equation. Civilian organizations whose missions are most germane to 
fighting the root causes of insurgencies – Department of State and USAID – are certainly 
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better poised than the Department of Defense to implement sound and sustainable 
governance and stability operations once combat operations culminate; their 
organizational toolkits are already equipped with the capabilities to conduct them.  
The revival of US counterinsurgency doctrine around 2006 laid the strategic 
foundation that would lead the American military to undergo a humanitarian facelift. 
Rather than properly augment civilian organizations to operate seamlessly to employ a 
bottom-up development and reconstruction paradigm, the US employed a top down 
military approach based on commander’s intent.
125
 The Department of State and USAID 
have artfully applied niche capabilities, such as PRTs, to bolster and advance US 
counterinsurgency objectives in the Middle East. Their success, however, has been 
overshadowed by mission overreach within the Department of Defense due to their 
massive budget and manpower allotment. In the future, the US must break institutional 
stovepipes, realign combat capability within the Department of State and USAID, and 
diffuse funds more appropriately if it plans to remain committed to its current 
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Is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles as the primary weapon in US counterterrorism 
operations more effective than US counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East? 
 
Introduction 
In May 2013, President Obama heralded a comprehensive strategy during a 
speech at National Defense University to effectively counter terrorism as the United 
States winds down its combat operations in in Afghanistan.
126
 The impetus behind the 
change in policy to fight terrorists worldwide is three fold: the threat terrorists pose to 
U.S. national security looms large, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have proven 
effective in killing operatives abroad, and U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan cannot be replicated in the future.  Indeed, UAVs have allowed the U.S. to 
expand counterterrorism (CT) activities beyond the borders of their counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, killing key leaders within Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban.  
However, there remains significant discourse around whether or not UAVs as a 
CT tactic or soldiers embedded within the indigenous population as a COIN tactic is 
more effective to ultimately combat terrorists’ ability to orchestrate an attack on the U.S. 
homeland. Current COIN doctrine, contained within Joint Publication 3-24, states, “In 
COIN, the defeat of the enemy’s military capabilities is just one component of what is 
ultimately a broader struggle for control over a target population that requires a balanced 
mix of both lethal and nonlethal actions.”
127
 Thus, U.S. COIN paradigm requires a heavy 
emphasis on non-kinetic activities; that is, those addressing the political, economic, and 
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security vulnerabilities of the host nation government that fuel the insurgency.  Yet, 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that the expectation for ground troops to 
both show restraint of force among the civilian population and then quickly use it against 
insurgents is sophomoric. UAVs, the premier weapon within U.S. CT operations, should 
also be the preeminent kinetic method within U.S. COIN operations. 
Definitions and Omissions 
There are some important definitions and distinctions to be discussed upfront that 
underpin the analysis that follows. In the first chapter, I define COIN operations as 
comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain an 
insurgency and address its root causes.
128
 Counterterrorism, as defined by the U.S. Army 
Field Manual, is “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, 
preempt and respond to terrorism.”
129
 Both COIN and CT are considered tenets under the 
broader irregular warfare architecture and can be employed in isolation or in combination 
with each other.   
 However, many defense scholars warn about conflating the theory of CT and 
COIN, asserting that they are two distinct warfare models with disparate assumptions on 
the use of force, the role the population plays, about the importance of host nation 
government legitimacy.
130
 Although nationalist insurgencies such as the Taliban and 
transnational groups, namely Al-Qaeda, have different motivations that underwrite U.S. 
COIN and CT operational campaigns, respectively, they both asymmetrically employ 
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terror to attain their political ends.
131
 To that end, U.S. strategic objectives in both CT and 
COIN are to deny these individuals the ability to plan and carry out attacks against the 
U.S. In discussing the effectiveness and utility of UAVs within my argument, COIN and 
CT operations are, in essence, interchangeable.  Finally, I will explicitly not address the 
legal debate of scoping the parameters of the Authorization of the Use of Force in 
analyzing the use of UAVs in the Middle East. My arguments will focus only on the 
operational effectiveness through the operational prism of U.S. COIN operations. That 
discussion, although important, is outside the scope of my argument.  
Literature Review 
  There is no shortage of literature on the effectiveness of UAVs to combat 
terrorists and insurgents that aim to plan and execute attacks on the U.S. homeland. 
While the proponents of UAVs tend to argue that they provide a sustainable, long-term 
kinetic approach to addressing global Islamist combatants, opponents of UAVs assert 
they may actually contribute to the growing number and more diffuse nature of terrorist 
groups. Thus, it is important to analyze the repository of existing literature and narratives 
of UAVs, specifically the main arguments underlying the positions of its advocates and 
antagonists.  
The literature that supports the use of UAVs in the U.S. global fight against 
terrorism share the position that they have been the chief kinetic tool that has weakened 
and largely dismantled Al-Qaeda core.  Since President Obama came into office, UAVs 
have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan 
and Yemen. This figure includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top 
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figures who are pivotal planners and not easily replaced.
132
 UAVs have not only 
annihilated key persons within terrorist groups, but they have forced them to change their 
tactics and behaviors in an attempt to evade attacks. In fact, documents retrieved from 
Osama bin Laden’s compound reveal he acknowledged the debilitating effect on Al-
Qaeda’s movements, advising high-level operatives to avoid gathering in large numbers 
and only be out during overcast days.
133
  
Another argument prevalent in pro-UAV literature is that UAVs are relatively 
cheap to operate and manage, allowing for a more viable operational footprint than large, 
protracted deployments of U.S. ground troops. In fact, the UAVs themselves are 
markedly less expensive compared to other U.S. aviation platforms. The MQ-9 Reaper, 
furnished with the most powerful weapons of all drones, costs around $12 million per 
airframe, while a conservative estimate of the cost of an F-22, the Air Force’s most 
advanced war plane, is 10 times more expensive.
134
 Not only do advocates for UAVs 
make the case that they are exorbitantly more resourceful than other platforms, but many 
proponents submit that the employment costs are relatively negligible. Pilots of the 
UAVs can control them virtually, and there are modest costs for infrastructure and the 
associated launch recovery element responsible for managing munitions loads and routine 
maintenance.  
This argument seamlessly flows into another one that UAV advocates tend to 
make; because there are relatively marginal infrastructure and footprint costs associated 
with UAVs, the U.S. can disentangle itself from kinetic operations against insurgents and 
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terrorists fairly easily and quickly. Compared to the nearly 400 U.S. and coalition bases 
built in Afghanistan, to include camps, forward operating bases, and combat outposts, 
many drones are based at previously established airfields in host countries that are 
modified and modernized by American engineers.
135
 This allows optimal flexibility in 
employing UAVs and precludes the need to entrench U.S. military assets in the countries 
where its targets are residing.  
Advocates of UAVs maintain that the confluence of their small footprint, low-cost 
and kinetic effectiveness have yielded politicians a palatable platform on which to 
continue hunting and killing terrorists with malevolent intentions to conducts attacks on 
the U.S. While the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost over 
6,800 American lives in combat, UAV operations in the broader Middle East have spared 
none.
136
 The literature endorsing the continued use of UAVs to address the threat of 
jihadist fighters is undoubtedly one side of the argument; however, there is an 
overwhelming undercurrent within all of existing work that acknowledges that the threat 
terrorists and insurgents pose to U.S. national security is not abating. Understanding the 
longevity of the threat, UAV protagonists state, the U.S. must wield a response with 
commensurate endurance. The American public has a proportionately large influence on 
how U.S. senior leaders and lawmakers react, and their tolerance for UAV operations in 
the Middle East over combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be ignored. 
Despite the prominent contention surrounding drones, a majority of Americans (56%) 
continue to support the program, according to a February survey conducted by Pew 
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Research, and only 26% oppose it.
137
  Perhaps most surprising is that the position on the 
use of UAVs cuts across partisan lines, with 68% of Republicans and 58% of Democrats 
approving of the drone operations.
138
 
The literature and arguments touting the efficacy of UAV operations ultimately 
all agree that they are the best weapon to counter terrorists and Islamist operatives that 
remain committed to attacking the U.S. to advance their ideological and political agenda.  
They represent the most preferable and surgical tactical answer that has left Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban with anemic leadership nexuses, compelling them to change their 
operational techniques and maneuvering. Cameron Munter, former U.S. Ambassador to 
Pakistan, states that drones are actually the most humane tools the U.S. could possibly 
employ in the broad fight against terrorism.
139
 A targeted approach with the judicious use 
of UAVs, advocates contend, provides the U.S. with an opportunity to progressively 
contain militant combatants plotting attacks on the U.S. without providing a conspicuous 
presence endemic to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
There is an equally saturated pool of literature opposing the use of UAVs to 
counter global terrorists and insurgents. Scholars and policy analysts that unfavorably 
view UAVs include “COIN-dinistas,” critics of nebulous Authorization of the Use of 
Force parameters, and those who views them as a breach of sovereignty.
140
 Dissecting 
their dithers associated with UAVs and their ineffectiveness to disrupt and dismantle 
terrorist and insurgent networks is necessary to full understand their limitations.  
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Many critics that are diametrically opposed to UAV operations as the prime 
counterterrorism tactic maintain that they are not only unproductive, but actually 
counterproductive. While UAVs have successfully killed key members of targeted 
terrorist and insurgent groups, many policy and national security experts are growing 
increasingly concerned that UAV operations themselves are creating more of them. The 
secretive nature of UAVs has provided Islamist extremists with fodder to generate a 
narrative to recruit more combatants. Specifically, many posit that the underlying 
obscurity of UAVs fosters further alienates the U.S. in its efforts to stymie the spread of 
al-Qaeda and its associated ideology that fuels its appeal.
141
  
While proponents of UAVs have argued that they’ve decimated so many key 
individuals within terrorist and insurgent factions to the point that they are structurally 
weakened, the opponents of the strikes assert their success is immeasurable. Richard 
Clarke, the architect of the U.S. drone program, even stated recently that U.S. “may 
actually be creating terrorists rather than eliminating them by using this program in the 
wrong way.”
142
 Indeed, there are several accounts of insurgents and terrorists claiming 
responsibility for attacks in direct retaliation for UAV strikes. In March 2009, the 
Pakistani Taliban attacked the Lahore policy academy in response to continued U.S. 
UAV operations, with Hakimullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud’s successor as leader of 
the Pakistani Taliban, heralding that the Taliban “will continue to launch suicide attacks 
until U.S. drone attacks are stopped.”
143
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Not only do adversaries of UAV operations emphasize the danger drones pose in 
serving as a recruitment tactic for terrorist and insurgent organizations, but they also 
contend that UAVs are contributing to diplomatic erosion between the U.S. and countries 
in which terrorists and insurgents are operating to attack the U.S. While the seemingly 
obvious success of drones precipitated an increase in their use between 2009-2011, many 
argue that the breach in sovereignty by the U.S. has yielded indelible consequences, 
including a more angered transnational Pashtu population and the deterioration of 
diplomatic relations with Pakistan.
144
 There is pervasive discourse over the level of 
support from the Pakistani government of U.S drone strikes within its borders, but critics 
broaden their case against them by claiming they breed mission creep that extends 
beyond the interest of American national security. UAVs operations, they argue, are a 
convenient tactical tool that insidiously extends the parameters of the U.S. strategy 
against terrorist and insurgent networks worldwide. “Micah Zenko, a fellow at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, stated, “We don’t say that we’re the counterinsurgency air 
force of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, but we are.”
145
 Troves of literature against the 
broad use of UAVs to kill identified terrorists and insurgents submit that the tactical 
precision of drones have dangerously morphed into a strategic political approach to the 
problem that will inevitably lead to U.S. foreign policy failure.  Terrorist expert Audrey 
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“COIN-dinistas” are generally incredulous about the use of UAVs to effectively 
counter terrorists or insurgents because they only kill the individuals without addressing 
the root cause of their discontent. Counterinsurgency operations, as codified within 
strategic military documents, requires a multi-pronged approach involving a concurrent 
economic, political, social and security response to truly counter terrorists and insurgents’ 
underlying motivations. UAVs, they argue, are woefully insufficient tactical technique to 
fulfill even the security element within counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, they 
contend that human intelligence, arguably more than any other type of intelligence, is 
integral in understand the violent sentiments behind terrorist and insurgent movements.  
Because U.S. UAV strikes almost always eliminate terrorist operatives, it is deprived of 
the opportunity to gain cascading intelligence that could be obtained through questioning 
them.
147
 For “COIN-dinistas,” this limitation is a disqualifier given the vital role of 
information transfer within successful counterterrorism campaigns. 
Perhaps the most pronounced undertone behind the arguments put forth by UAV 
critics is the lawfulness in question behind their vast use and employment. There are 
unambiguous legal ramifications in question behind the use of UAVs and whether or not 
the U.S. can rightfully continue to vindicate strikes against insurgents and terrorists 
abroad. Opponents are resolute in asserting that the narrative surrounding the use of 
drones in support of counterterrorism operations, that is, it is a U.S. strategic priority is to 
protect American lives, is unacceptable. The long-term costs in authority and moral 
implications, they declare, are not fully weighed alongside the marginal near-term 
benefit. Ardent opponents of UAV operations argue that they are simply immoral and 
unjust weapons because unintended consequences, albeit outweighed their success, 
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generate irreparable damage to U.S. objectives.  Prolific legal and moral deliberations, 
including accusations of extra-judiciary executions, violation of international 
humanitarian law, conveniently dismissing the right to due process and inadvertent 
civilian casualties, dominate the chorus of UAV critics.
148
       
There is abounding existing literature to support scoping or even completely 
shuttering the use of UAVs to fight terrorists and insurgents channeling their political and 
ideological fervor against the U.S. Reluctantly acknowledging, however, that the threat 
posed by these networks is not only unrelenting but metastasizing, much of the existing 
work is grappling with how to manufacture a UAV program that delineates wartime 
UAV operations from peacetime UAV operations. The U.S. existing constitutional 
framework is currently designed to declare war within the confines of state-on-state 
conflict.
149
 While many scholars call for the need to scope and define an operational 
architecture that is tenable and sustainable for future UAV operations, it is uncertain 
within the currently policy circles what that looks like.    
Methods & Data 
I will unpack current UAV operations in Pakistan and Yemen as my primary case 
studies for analysis. I leverage a variety of data sources, to include strategic defense 
documents, open source CIA/DIA documents, congressional reports, think-tank reviews, 
surveys from civilians in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen. To illuminate the differences 
between drone operations in Yemen and Pakistan, I will contrast COIN operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq where appropriate.   
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Case studies:  
 The expansive deployments of UAVs operating in Pakistan and Yemen, although 
contentious in nature, have proven fruitful in eradicating key Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
members. Drone strikes in these two countries persist, branded as silent killers, compared 
to the ostensible combat challenges associated with the ongoing U.S. COIN operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the CT operations in Pakistan and Yemen are markedly 
different, both in execution and the organizations spearheading them. UAV operations in 
Pakistan and Yemen are executed under the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) versus the U.S. military, as is the 
case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, a different authorities framework, operating under 
Title 50 authorities versus Title 10, provides plausible deniability to U.S. drone strikes.
150
 
This configuration of authorities has yielded unprecedented murkiness surrounding UAV 
operations, but they have undeniably weakened Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and 
Al-Qaeda members in Yemen and Pakistan, respectively.  
UAV Operations in Pakistan 
Pakistan is the birthplace of global Islamist jihad and hosts a series of terrorist of 
insurgent networks that pose a threat to the U.S. Pakistan is perhaps the most littered with 
the highest number of high-value targets in accordance with the U.S. intelligence because 
of the sheer profile of networks. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there are 
12 different domestic terrorist groups, and 32 different transnational groups, all of which 
are largely categorized within sectarian, anti-Indian, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its 
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affiliates, and the Pakistani Taliban.
151
 This issue alone presents the U.S. with the 
quandary in employing a cohesive COIN campaign in Pakistan.  
 As a result, the U.S. has largely responded with UAV operations to the rampant 
insurgent threat emanating from Pakistan in 2004.  Within the first four years of the drone 
campaign in Pakistan, the U.S. used in the Hindu Kush region was 42 with an accelerated 
increase to 53 in 2009 and peaking at 122 in 2010.
152
 Although reports declined starting 
in 2011 due to souring relations between the Pakistanis and the U.S., the precision of the 
UAVs was unequivocally improved. In an expose released in 2012 with Taliban and al-
Qaeda members, Pir Zubair Shah provided a personal account of the significant impact 
the application of UAV strikes has had on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) save haven, notably stating that al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters that must go out 
of their way to avoid convening in large groups, even when attending mosque or pray.
153
 
Furthermore, collateral civilian casualties have continued to decrease over the lifetime of 
the campaign. In 2013, civilian casualties hit the lowest rate ever albeit there were less 
UAV engagements than the prior year.  Yet, a notable observation is that the casualty rate 
in Pakistan for civilians and "unknowns" -- those individuals whose identify cannot be 
confirmed as either militants or civilians -- was approximately 40% under President Bush 
as compared to about 7% under President Obama.
154
  
 While the U.S. has enjoyed tactical success in Pakistan using UAV strikes to 
contain the insurgent and terrorist threat facing American national security, Pakistan’s 
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tenuous internal security and safety measures make it difficult for U.S. involvement to be 
anything other than kinetic. Pakistan’s population of 180 million, with nearly 60 percent 
of the population under the age of 24, is shrouded in high illiteracy rates, poor access to 
education and healthcare, resource scarcity such as water and electricity, and growing 
socioeconomic challenges.
155
 Political institutions remain categorically underdeveloped 
and corrupt, with a ruinous jostling for power between a strong army and weak civilian-
led governance paralyzing the nation. Additionally, precarious U.S.-Pakistani, sensitive 
to civilian deaths caused by drones and U.S. relations to India, precludes the U.S. from 
wielding other elements of power to weaken terrorist and insurgent networks. American 
suspicion of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supporting elements of the Taliban, coupled 
with incidents such as the U.S.’ withholding the special operation mission that killed 
Osama bin Laden in Abbattabad prior to execution, further contribute to unstable 
relations between the two. It also widely understood how unpopular the U.S. among 
Pakistani civilians. Around 69% of Pakistanis have unfavorable perceptions of the current 
U.S. government, and only 10% of the respondents believe the U.S. has a positive 
influence in world affairs, according to a poll conducted by the University of Maryland in 
2009.
156 
While the UAV campaign in Pakistan directly allow the U.S. to combat the threat 
of insurgents and terrorists looking to coordinate and execute attacks on the U.S., there is 
pervasive recognition by both the U.S. and Pakistani governments that UAV operations 
remains the best options to temper the issue. Specifically, as the U.S. prepares to draw 
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withdraw its foot soldiers in Pakistan’s neighbor, Afghanistan, the need to maintain a 




UAV Operations in Yemen 
 The U.S. UAV campaign in Yemen is two years older than the U.S. campaign in 
Pakistan, beginning in 2002 to target Al-Qaeda-affiliated militants associated with high 
profile attacks against U.S. and Western interests. While Al-Qaeda core began to 
deteriorate largely due to U.S. CT efforts, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
has grown to become the most dangerous and capable faction of Al-Qaeda to orchestrate 
plans to threaten U.S. national security.  While U.S. strikes in Pakistan began to decline 
in 2011, they spiked in Yemen, particularly as the Obama administration began 
employing UAVs to support the Yemeni government's fight against the group.
157
 Starting 
in June 2012, Yemeni military forces under new President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi 
regained control of cities in Abyan and Shabwah that had served as AQAP strongholds in 
southern Yemen a year earlier. While the absolute number of UAV strikes in Yemen is 
difficult to measure, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that there had been 
between 54 and 64 between 2002 and 2013, killing between 334-488 militants.
158
 
 Yet AQAP is not Yemen’s singular problem threatening stability and 
undermining the President Hadi’s efforts to improve the current state of security. A long-
simmering separatist movement in the south has also gained strength, and many 
southerners want independence from the Houthis, the Shi’ite insurgent group in the 
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 Unique among the northern and southern groups, however, is that they are too 
large and locally popular to be easily contained by Yemeni military forces. Albeit AQAP 
does not enjoy that luxury, it is compounding Yemen’s internal security struggles and has 
elevated the threat on a global scale. 
 Similar to Pakistan, Yemen’s state of economic and political affairs is 
distressingly anemic.  Yemen is replete with high levels of corruption and 
unemployment, estimated at some 40% and inflation anywhere from 10% to 20%.
160
 
Yemenis face severe shortages of fuel, water, and electricity, and nearly 45% percent of 
Yemen’s population live below the poverty line.
161
 Yet, the Arab revolutionary 
movements beginning in 2011, more pointedly in Yemen starting in February 2012, 
reflects the growing intolerance for autocratic repression. The mobilization in Yemen 
spurred a re-negotiation of the social contract between its people and the government, 
leading to the negotiated ousting of President Saleh and the formation of a democracy. 
While the movement precipitated the hope towards installing a legitimate political 
framework, Yemen’s relatively new government is confronted with challenges from all 
angles: the old regime, the protestors and regional Islamist terrorism.  
The perception of American involvement in targeting and killing Al-Qaeda-based 
militants among the Yemeni population contained more mixed results compared to the 
more unified outrage expressed by the Pakistani people.  In Abyan, for instance, there is 
little complaint about the U.S. role in the military campaign; Ahmed, a member of the 
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citizens' militia, scoffed at claims that American participation compromises Yemeni 
sovereignty by stating that, "Al-Qaeda brought Saudi, Somali and Afghan fighters into 
my town. If the American drones help to kill them, we won't mind."
162
 However, the 
salvos of disapproval from the Yemeni populace over inadvertent civilian deaths cannot 
be ignored. In December 2013, a U.S. drone strike killed 15 Yemenis traveling in a 
wedding party, intended to kill an AQAP commander. In that same month, Yemen's 




CIA-led UAV operations against Al-Qaeda-affiliated operatives have allowed the 
U.S. and Yemen to coordinate attacks AQAP in the midst of significant Yemeni 
government reform and reconstruction. While strikes have been lauded in keeping attacks 
against the U.S. at bay, AQAP continues to grow in numbers and lethality. The U.S. State 
Department estimates the organization has close to 1,000 members, reflecting a dramatic 
growth from about 200-300 members in 2009.
164
 The U.S. UAV campaign has certainly 
impacted Yemen’s success in driving AQAP militants out of populated areas in southern 
provinces and in enfeebling its leadership. That said, the group continues to operate in the 
capital and continue fighting asymmetrically.165 
Analysis 
 UAV operations in Pakistan and Yemen undeniably weakened transnational 
terrorists, specifically Al-Qaeda operatives and its affiliates, and their ability to exercise 
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malice against the U.S. While the CT campaigns have some notable drawbacks, they are 
markedly more effective than manufacturing COIN campaigns similar to those executed 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps the most conspicuous reason is that the threats 
emanating from Pakistan and Yemen are not bounded by physical parameters; their 
loyalties are state-agnostic and thus their movements reflect a tendency to cross borders.  
During the Cold War, an insurgency’s home was usually a country, as seen in Vietnam or 
Malayia. But the home of today’s insurgents is defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, 
social, cultural, and religious characteristics that allow them to further their political and 
ideological ambitions.166 In Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgents wanted to unseat the 
current political structure, thus the U.S. campaigns to counter them was state-based. With 
Al-Qaeda core debilitated by U.S. UAV campaigns, its diffusion into more, but smaller 
factions will require an even more borderless response from the U.S.   As a result, U.S. 
COIN operational tactics cannot easily be peppered across several states given the need 
to tailor its focus on bolstering the host nation government.   
 Although U.S. UAV operations have contributed to the disaffection among the 
Pakistani and Yemeni populations, they paradoxically have been supported by their 
governments. Government support, albeit tacit and hesitant at times, has allowed U.S. to 
make tactical inroads to defeat Islamist militants within their borders.  In 2012, Yemeni 
President Hadi unequivocally endorsed continued U.S.-led UAV strikes in Yemen given 
their technological advantage and effectiveness, asserting that Yemen remains “a favored 
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counterterrorism partner of the United States.”
167
 Pakistani government support, however, 
is much less enthusiastic. Despite repeatedly rebuking the U.S. drone campaign, top 
officials in Pakistan’s government have for years implicitly approved the CIA-led 
campaign and constantly receive classified briefings on strikes and casualties. In fact, the 
CIA even used Pakistani airstrips for its Predator fleet (MQ-1 platforms) in the mid-
2000s.
168
 Because the U.S. drones are a point of consternation among the people they 
lead, the Pakistani and Yemeni governments must artfully deal with the U.S. to ensure 
their political capital is protected while also complying with U.S. efforts to achieve 
national security objectives.  Extensive boots on the ground, as demonstrated in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, require interacting with both the government and its people. It is the 
Pakistani and Yemeni people themselves that yield tenuous political relations with their 
leaders and the U.S., therefore limiting U.S. involvement to covert operations only. 
 Securing political viability among the Pakistani and Yemen leadership is largely 
what affords the U.S. operational longevity within their UAV campaigns. In order to 
protect their interests in the U.S. pursuit of combating global terrorism within their 
borders, the U.S. has had to adhere to a strict line of authority to continue that promise.  
Parking UAV operations within the CIA offers legal cover the U.S. In conducting strikes 
as covert actions under U.S. law, it provides plausible deniability and does not require the 
Pakistani and Yemeni governments to attribute the attacks to a source; under U.S. 
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military law, troops cannot conduct hostile actions outside a declared war zone.
169
 The 
Pakistani and Yemeni governments can circuitously inform the public of UAV strikes 
while sparing the details and preserve their political stature. While the U.S. recognizes 
that their ground troops would be a corrosive kinetic measure to employ in Pakistan and 
Yemen, the top officials within both countries also recognize that their own troops are 
perhaps even more harmful in combating resident terrorist. The Pakistani and Yemeni 
militaries are infamous for regularly torturing and executing detainees, and they often 
unscrupulously bomb civilian areas or use draconian tactics against Islamist militant 
groups.
170
 Thus, while the U.S. CIA-led UAV campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen are far 
from flawless, there is no other viable tactical alternative that is either organic to the two 
nations or to other U.S. employment options.  
 The security challenges roiling Iraq and Afghanistan, much like Pakistan and 
Yemen, are not causes but symptoms of broader political, economic and ethnic 
instability. More pointedly, these challenges have existed since the inception of all four 
nations, and thus will be influenced by exogenous influence, particularly the U.S. The 
population-centric U.S. COIN campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq, although riddled with 
challenges, were more appropriate given that the U.S. actively participated in fabricating 
their democratic governments. Pakistani and Yemeni governments are cognizant that 
economic development and political legitimacy must be accomplished organically. That 
said, the ideological undercurrent that perpetuates the Islamist militant groups in Pakistan 
and Yemen that the U.S. strikes target are impervious to COIN principles. There is no 
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remedial “hearts and minds” campaign that exists to combat global radical Islam. Simply 
put, the resolve of the U.S. is not to eradicate the motivations of Al-Qaeda operatives, but 
to preclude them from posing a threat to U.S. national security.  
 However, UAV operations alone are inadequate to support Pakistan and Yemen in 
combating terrorism within their borders. As mentioned above, both suffer from severe 
economic woes that manifest in high unemployment and poverty rates. The confluence of 
scant economic conditions and anti-American sentiment precludes a bottom-up approach 
that the U.S. attempted to employ in Iraq and Afghanistan. A continued CT campaign, 
coupled with political advisory and economic support teams from top-down, could lend 
itself to support the governments of Pakistan and Yemen and embolden their efforts to 
improve the political, economic and social issues they face today.
171
 Decentralized 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan yielded cumbersome oversight requirements that were 
hard to measure in aggregate; a light foot print, top-down approach in Pakistan and 
Yemen would avoid this U.S. concern, and help strengthen their governments’ outward 
support of UAV operations.  
Conclusion 
I conclude that the deliberate shift away from troop-heavy, comprehensive COIN 
campaigns and a heavier focus on CT operations is a testament to how effective UAVs 
have been in weakening and dismantling Islamic terrorist groups that pose a threat to U.S. 
national security. A more acute focus on killing them versus engulfing terrorist-laden 
countries with economic, political and security support proves that the danger 
surrounding global Islamist militancy has not subsided, and will in fact require persistent 
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attention by the U.S. for the foreseeable future. As such, the increase in the U.S. UAV 
fleet, both in the military and the CIA, has been unprecedented. The Department of 
Defense owns about 7000 UAV platforms compared to the total of 50 they owned in 
2001, and the Air Force trained more drone pilots in 2011 than they did conventional 
fighter and comber pilots.
172
  
Unfortunately, I conclude that the U.S.’ focus on orchestrating and executing a 
holistic COIN campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan by attempting to inject soft capability 
within ground troop fighting force was overambitious and detracted from the kinetic 
capability required. The U.S. did not sufficiently rely on UAVs to provide a surgical 
military response to alleviate the role of the military and civilian teams to integrate and 
influence the local population. Conversely, I have showcased that the UAV campaigns in 
Pakistan and Yemen are a resourceful and effective tactical answer to the strategic 
problem in denying terrorists the ability to conduct an attack on U.S. soil.  
 Looking forward, the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates has survived 
despite U.S. war efforts over the last decade, and the radical Islamic ideology blanketing 
the Middle East will have profound impacts worldwide.
173
 The U.S. should shift the 
fulcrum underpinning COIN operations to accentuate CT operations rather than 
modifying U.S. ground troops, and allow UAVs to do the fighting they were explicitly 
designed to do.  
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The U.S. COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have consumed the focus of 
U.S. operational capability over the last decade. The Field Manual, written by General 
Petraeus, represents the bedrock by which the U.S. employed military, economic, and 
political capability into a cohesive force package. The U.S. doctrine, inspired by David 
Galula who published COIN theory based on French-Algerian COIN war in the 1950s, 
underscores that such operations requires an "intensity of effort and vastness of 
means."
174
 As such, the U.S. has applied an acute and disproportionately large show of 
force for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to humanize the battlefield and 
gaining the trust of the local population.  Revolutionizing the U.S. military readiness 
profile and injecting elements of soft power are emblematic of the U.S. operational 
response to its COIN doctrine. However, I conclude that the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are evidenced as operational malpractice as a result employing an 
imbalanced kinetic an un-kinetic force.   
The U.S. has fashioned comprehensive COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan 
that have overemphasized the role of ground troops as a kinetic toolbox and 
underemphasized the role of UAVs and civilian capabilities. The U.S. transformed and 
grew the U.S. military to meet the multi-faceted operational requirements mostly because 
it was not willing or able to increase the capacity or the lines of authority across the more 
germane civilian-based organizations, such as Department of State and USAID. 
Moreover, I conclude that it has branded, to its detriment, UAV operations in the context 
                                                        
174
 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, Ct: Praeger Security 
international, 2006), page 52. 
 76 
of CT operations and population-centric foot soldiers in the context of COIN operations. 
Interlacing the two should have been a priority from the inception of the campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, but rather it downplayed the kinetic advantage endemic to the 
UAV fleets. My arguments pinpoint that the U.S. drone campaigns in Pakistan and 
Yemen have demonstrated that a surgical response is more cost-effective and politically 
sustainable while able to secure strategic objectives by denying terrorists the ability to 
carry out attacks against the U.S.   
Current defense and national security policy platforms, to include the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance, Obama’s refined CT approach, and the 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, stress the need to focus on 21st century threats and to recalibrate the 
U.S. military after over a decade of protracted combat operations. While this is largely to 
protect the U.S. stature as the world’s pre-eminent fighting force, it is also because it has 
not enjoyed strategic victory as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Iraq, 
specifically, has devolved into mass upheaval as a result of political disenfranchisement 
on behalf of the Maliki government; any previously touted U.S. success there has been 
upended, and Islamist extremists are capitalizing on its dissolution. Fiscal pressures 
coupled with a more diffuse threat of Islamist extremists looking to employ terrorist 
attacks on the U.S. are additional complications, and a U.S. defense strategy refresh to 
account for that is a sign that the U.S. simply cannot afford to fail.  
Yet, if past is prologue, the U.S. will once again find itself involved in COIN 
operations at some point in the future.  While the current Department of Defense’s plans 
typify a focus on high-end combat threats, such as anti-access/area denial in the Asia-
Pacific, they rarely become operationalized as written. When the time comes to 
 77 
regenerate forces suited for COIN operations, I conclude that the U.S. must leverage its 
existing tools, such as UAVs, and also expand its civilian-led institutions with the organic 
capabilities needed for a population-ridden battlefield.  
General Petraeus’ Field Manual should continue to serve as the U.S. COIN 
guidebook; in fact, re-writing it would cheapen its foundational principles. That said, the 
U.S. needs to manufacture a better cohesive response by more seamlessly intertwining its 
platforms and its people. In his book, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and 
Dilemmas in National Security, Richard Betts reminds us that, “the most salient 
characteristic of war is that it involves killing. If politicians are to authorize war, they 
must endorse killing.”
175
 COIN warfare is no exception and the U.S. must avoid the 
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